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Abstract Successful innovation of prescription drugs requires a substantial
amount of marketing support. There is, however, much concern about the
effects of marketing expenditures on the demand of pharmaceutical products
(Manchanda et al., Market Lett 16(3/4):293–308, 2005). For example, excessive
marketing could stimulate demand for products in the absence of a fundamental
need. It also has been suggested that increased marketing expenditures may reduce
the price elasticity of demand and allow firms to charge higher prices (Windmeijer
et al., Health Econ 15(1):5–18, 2005). In this paper, we present the outcomes of an
empirical study in which we determine the effects of pharmaceutical marketing
expenditures using a number of frequently used “standardized” models. We
determine which models perform best in terms of predictive validity and adequate
descriptions of reality. We demonstrate, among others, that the effects of
promotional efforts are brand specific and that most standardized models do not
provide adequate descriptions of reality. We find that marketing expenditures have
no or moderate effects on demand for pharmaceutical products in The Netherlands.
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1 Introduction
The pharmaceutical industry plays a vital role in health care. In the United States, the
health care industry accounts for 16% of the gross national product, a percentage
expected to increase in the near future, though the growth rate is slowing (Catlin et
al. 2007). Revenues generated by US pharmaceutical firms have increased at a faster
rate than those of most other health care components (Peters 2004). For example, in
1990, expenditures on pharmaceuticals as a fraction of total health care expenditures
in the United States amounted to 5.6%; by 2007, that percentage had grown to
10.2% (CMS 2009).
Although prescription drugs and medical devices can improve the health of
patients suffering from chronic diseases and reduce total health care expendi-
tures, the pharmaceutical industry faces significant criticism for several reasons,
including the profitability of the sector and its widely debated marketing efforts.
In particular, marketing is said to reduce price sensitivity of demand for
prescription drugs, leading to negative welfare effects. So, for example, Hurwitz
and Caves (1988), Rizzo (1999), and Windmeijer et al. (2005) find that marketing
expenditures lower price sensitivity and conclude that marketing expenditures
mainly have a persuasive effect.
These findings are in contrast to Leffler (1981) who identifies an informative
effect of marketing efforts because they increase price sensitivity. Some studies
report strongly positive effects of direct-to-customer advertising (Rosenthal et al.
2003), whereas others reveal negative elasticities (Ling et al. 2002). Mixed findings
motivate us to evaluate model structures and to assess the assumptions on which
these models are based. We also want to investigate what effects these assumptions
have on model outcomes.
Many models that have been developed to investigate pharmaceutical promotional
marketing effects are based on pooled data and hence use a specific but very restricted
model. Data are pooled over (1) different brands, which are (2) in different stages of their
product life cycle and pertain to (3) different product categories. For example, Rizzo’s
(1999) model estimates the effects of promotional efforts on demand and the price
elasticity of demand for antihypertensive drugs. In turn, Rizzo’s model has been
slightly modified in a study by Windmeijer et al. (2005), which is based on De Laat
et al. (2002). Their study considers the following research questions:
a. What is the price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs?
b. What is the effect of promotion on sales, and how much of the effect is due to
“market stealing” versus “market making”?
c. Does marketing change the price elasticity of demand?
The answers to these questions constitute important input for political debate
about policy interventions on pharmaceutical markets in The Netherlands. However,
the answers are based on demand equations that are pooled across (140) brands and
(11) product categories. Furthermore, in these models, the marketing expenditures
are aggregated over all marketing instruments and dynamics are not modeled
appropriately. Finally, the demand equations contain prices, but neither prescribers
nor consumers are likely to respond to pharmaceutical prices. Hence, we have
doubts about the model’s outcomes.
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In this study, we develop models to determine the effects of promotional
marketing effects on sales which:
a. are, at least in principle, unique for each brand in each category, and hence,
b. are not based on pooled data.
We demonstrate that the parameters show large variations in parameter values and
that less restricted models have better statistical and predictive validity. We also
demonstrate that conclusions of previous studies are based on incorrect model
assumptions. Specifically, in contrast to earlier findings, we do not find evidence for
persuasive effects of marketing expenditures. Based on the outcomes of a more
appropriate model, we conclude that the pooled analysis suggest stronger effects of
marketing expenditures than can be substantiated by brand-level analyses.
This may affect welfare negatively. Overestimating the effectiveness of
promotional instruments may lead to a higher, but less effective than expected,
level of spending. In turn, this may lead to the unwanted effect that manufacturers
raise their prices to compensate for the increased cost/sales ratio.
The order of discussion is as follows. First, we discuss a well-known model
developed by Rizzo (1999) and modified by Windmeijer et al. (2005). We critically
evaluate the outcomes of this model. Then, we discuss and evaluate some alternative
specifications that describe demand equations for a substantial number of
pharmaceutical brands in a more appropriate manner than the previous models. We
estimate a number of different models using individual brand-level data for 49
brands from five product categories of the Dutch prescription drug market.
2 The Rizzo model
Many models attempt to determine the effects of pharmaceutical promotional efforts
on the demand for pharmaceuticals. Manchanda et al. (2005) and Kremer et al.
(2008) provide brief surveys; Stremersch (2008) positions the somewhat broader
field of health and marketing. In this section, we discuss a well-known model
developed by Rizzo (1999) and slightly modified by Windmeijer et al. (2005). Both
models have been published in nonmarketing journals but are relevant for the
following reasons. Firstly, Rizzo (1999) is one of the first to empirically investigate
the effects of marketing expenditures on price elasticity of pharmaceutical demand.
Secondly, the outcomes indicate a persuasive effect of marketing efforts and are
extensively cited in the (marketing) literature (e.g., Narayanan et al. 2005;
Venkataraman and Stremersch 2007). Finally, the conclusions have also had
substantial impact on public policy makers’ opinions concerning the welfare effects
of pharmaceutical promotions (De Laat et al. 2002; Windmeijer et al. 2005). The
model of Windmeijer et al. (2005) is relevant because it adapts Rizzo’s model for the
Dutch pharmaceutical market. Their modified Rizzo model takes the following
structure:
ln qit ¼ gi þ r1ln qi;t1 þ r2ln qi;t2 þ a1 þ a2lnmesitð Þln pit þ a3 þ a4lnmesitð Þln pcit
þ a5lnmefit þ a6lnmesit þ a7lnmefcit þ a8lnmescit þ bXit þ "it
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where, for pharmaceutical product i in month t, qit is the number of prescriptions,
defined in daily doses, a standard measure to compare drug use across different
drugs; γi is the brand-specific constant; mesit is the marketing expenditures stock,
namely, the stock of expenditures on detailing, advertising, and direct mail (in
Euros); pit is the price of the drug, calculated as the ratio of the costs and volume of
sales (in Euros); pcit is the average price of competing drugs for i; mefit is the
marketing expenditure flow (i.e., current marketing expenditures); mefcit and mescit
are the marketing expenditure flow and stock of competing products for i,
respectively; Xit is the vector of several additional variables, including product age
(months and months squared), year and month dummies, and dummies for policy
changes; and εit is the random disturbance term.
The stock variable mesit in turn is defined as:
mesit ¼ rdmesi;t1 þ mefit
where ρd is the discount rate. The mescit variable is defined analogously. If α2>0
(α4<0), then marketing expenditures lower the absolute value of own (cross-)price
elasticity of demand. The model also allows marketing expenditures to have a direct
effect on the quantity demanded in the form of the parameters α5–α8.
This model has been estimated by Windmeijer et al. (2005) using pooled data.
The authors use monthly data of 140 products from 11 therapeutic markets: allergy,
anxiety, asthma, cholesterol, depression, hypertension, migraine, pregnancy, rheu-
matism, sleeping disorders, and ulcers. The 11 markets together cover 58% of the
total Dutch market for reimbursed prescription pharmaceuticals, as measured in
pharmaceutical costs. The dataset is restricted to quantities sold on the basis of
prescriptions written by general practitioners (GPs) and psychiatrists because the
detailing data is based on a panel consisting of these physicians. The (pooled)
estimates are summarized in Table 1.
The results in Table 1 suggest the following conclusions:
a. average premarketing own-brand price elasticity is negative (p<0.10);
Table 1 Parameter estimates for the model of Windmeijer et al. (2005)
Coefficient of Estimate
ln qi,t−1 (lag 1 of sales) 0.68*
ln qi,t−2 (lag 2 of sales) 0.14*
ln pi,t (price) −0.18**
ln mesi,t×ln pi,t (interaction) 0.02*
ln pci,t (comp. price) 0.10
ln mesi,t×ln pci,t (interaction) −0.01**
ln mefi,t (flow) 0.01*
ln mesi,t (stock) 0.04*
ln mefci,t (comp. flow) 0.01*
ln mesci,t (comp. stock) −0.03*
*p<0.05, **p<0.10 (two-tailed)
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b. on average, pharmaceutical marketing (flow and stock variables) increases
demand;
c. on average, pharmaceutical marketing reduces price sensitivity of demand.
In their study, Windmeijer et al. (2005) assess the overall effect of an increase in
own-brand and competitors’ marketing expenditures by adding the corresponding
flow and stock parameter estimates. They determine the long-term marketing
elasticities as follows:
Long–term own–brand marketing elasticity ¼ ba5 þ ba6
1 br1  br2
¼ 0:3:
Long–term cross–brand marketing elasticity ¼ ba7 þ ba8
1 br1  br2
¼ 0:12:
In addition, on the basis of the same outcomes (and the same data), De Laat et al.
(2002) determine the market-making and market-stealing effects by considering both
the effects of own marketing and competitors’ marketing on sales. The net sales
effect of a 1% increase of marketing expenditures by all players in a market is (0.3−
0.12)=0.18%. De Laat et al. (2002) further state that this is the market-making effect
because market-stealing effects cancel out if all players increase their marketing
expenditures equally. Then, the remaining 0.12% is the market-stealing effect. Thus,
market making accounts for 60% of the total quantity effect and market stealing for
40%.
The Rizzo model and its modifications are quite well accepted, and outcomes of
empirical studies based on this model are generally interpreted as truths, as in
Windmeijer et al. (2005). However, we have strong doubts about these outcomes
because:1
1. the data are pooled across 140 brands and 11 markets;
2. marketing expenditures are aggregated;
3. the inclusion of lagged endogenous variables present numerous (and well-
documented) empirical and conceptual problems;2
4. price fluctuations in The Netherlands (as in many other countries) are
predominantly set by policy makers from government, industry, and insurance
companies and are not directly set by pharmaceutical companies themselves.
In our empirical analysis, we will demonstrate that pooling over brands even
within a submarket leads to biased parameter estimates. To this end, we use a
subsample of the same dataset used by Windmeijer et al. (2005).
The meta-analysis by Kremer et al. (2008) demonstrates that the effect of different
marketing efforts (journal advertising, detailing efforts, etc.) are substantially
different from each other.
An important characteristic of this industry is the complex relationship between
price charged by the manufacturers and quantity demanded by the patient due to the
1 We thank one of the reviewers for the helpful comments in formulating our critisism
2 See, for example, Leeflang et al. (2000, pp. 85–98) and Van Heerde et al. (2000).
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existence of intermediate parties such as governments, health maintenance
organizations, or private insurers (Manchanda et al. 2005, p. 301). In many
European countries, intermediaries cover most of the cost of prescription drugs. This
holds particularly for the time window which is considered in the calibrated models.
Insured patients likely are not price sensitive and have little awareness of the retail
price of their prescription. Physicians, working in the interest of patients, also do not
have a financial stimulus to be price sensitive. Furthermore, they tend to be unaware
of the retail price of specific drugs (Hurwitz and Caves 1988; Newhouse 1993).
Gönül et al. (2001) find that considerations about drug efficacy and patients’
conditions represent the primary drivers in the decision process, clearly overriding
price concerns. Gonzalez et al. (2008) classify 83% of the physicians as being price
insensitive. Hence, we have doubts about the inclusion of price and price
interactions in pharmaceutical demand models which are calibrated using data from
Western European countries.
In the next section, we specify alternative models that overcome these issues.
3 Alternative specifications
In the empirical part of this paper, we calibrate the model of Windmeijer et al. (2005)
that we discussed in the previous section using a subset of the data of Windmeijer et
al. We label this model as model 0. We also estimate an unpooled, brand-specific
version of model 0 and refer to this model as model 1:
ln qit ¼ gi þ r1iln qi;t1 þ r2iln qi;t2 þ a1i þ a2ilnmesitð Þln pit
þ a3i þ a4ilnmesitð Þln pcit þ a5ilnmefit þ a6ilnmesit þ a7ilnmefcit
þ a8ilnmescit þ biXit þ "it:
Model 1 overcomes the first issue that we raise in the previous section. In order to
take the other issues into account, we specify alternative model structures to estimate
the effects of marketing efforts on the demand for pharmaceutical products. In the
next section, we discuss the outcomes of calibrating these models using monthly
data from 49 brands of five product categories of the Dutch pharmaceutical market.
As a starting point, we specify model 2, which is an alternative specification and
based on Wittink (2002):
ln qit ¼ a0i þ a1Ageit þ a2Age2it þ a3Age3it þ g1k ln JADit þ g2k lnDETit
þ g3k lnDMit þ g4k ln JADit  lnDETitð Þ þ g5k ln JADit  lnDMitð Þ
þ g6k lnDETit  lnDMitð Þ þ g7k lnCJADit þ g8k lnCDETit þ g9k lnCDMit
þ bXit þ uit
where, for pharmaceutical product i in month t, Ageit is the age of the brand; JADit is
the medical journal advertising expenditures; DETit is the detailing efforts; DMit is
the direct marketing efforts; CJADit is the competitive medical journal advertising
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expenditures; CDETit is the competitive detailing efforts; CDMit is the competitive
direct marketing efforts; uit is the random disturbance term; and qit and Xit as have
been defined in Section 2. The index k indicates the category to which brand i
belongs.
The intercept in model 2 is brand specific, but the parameters that represent
marketing efforts effects are pooled across brands that belong to the same category k.
In this respect, model 2 differs from model 1, which contains brand-specific
parameters. This possibly alleviates our first issue. By including the third-order
polynomial in Age we account for the diffusion pattern, thereby removing another
source of differences between brands.
Model 2 also explicitly accommodates differences in effectiveness of the different
marketing instruments (issue 2) and interactions between the marketing variables
(Narayanan et al. 2004). Furthermore, this model also allows for differences in
effectiveness of competitive instruments. Model 2 does not suffer from issues 3 and
5 as we did not include lagged sales and price as explanatory variables.
The second alternative specification is model 3 whose structure is similar to that
of model 2. However, all parameters are now brand specific: the age parameters and
the parameter vector β receive an additional index i and the index k of the marketing
efforts parameters is replaced by an index i. Hence, this model allows for a
maximum level of heterogeneity.
In our final model, we simplify model 3 in the following ways: we lower the
order of the polynomial in Age, we remove the interactions between the marketing
mix instruments, and we aggregate the competitive marketing expenditures. This
results in the following specification for model 4:
ln qit ¼ a0i þ a1iAgeit þ a2iAge2it þ g1iln JADit þ g2ilnDETit þ g3ilnDMit
þ g4ilnmefcit þ biXit þ uit:
Model 4 is a much more parsimonious model than model 3. Given that it is well
known that there are synergies between various marketing instruments (Narayanan
et al. 2004), we are aware that we may encounter problems in terms of model fit by
omitting such interactions. More parsimonious models, however, will probably lead
to better predictions (compare, e.g., Foekens et al. 1994). Another advantage of
model 4 over model 3 is that it will not suffer from multicollinearity due to the
inclusion of interactions.
4 Empirical application
We calibrate models 0–4 using monthly data covering the period 1994–1999 for 49
brands from five products categories of the Dutch prescription drug market. The
dataset is an important subset of the dataset used by Windmeijer et al. (2005).
Model 0 is a basic model to many other models and has been used for public
policy decision making. In Table 2, we present the outcomes of estimating model 0
using our data. Given that we have only a subset of the data of Windmeijer et al., the
results are not identical to theirs (see Table 1). Specifically, we find a slightly
stronger price coefficient, but an insignificant price–marketing interaction term. It is
Market Lett (2010) 21:121–133 127
also noteworthy that the competitive price coefficient is negative and significant,
which is unexpected.
Table 3 summarizes for each of the parameters of model 1 the variation in the
brand-specific estimation results. The column labeled “mean” indicates the mean
value of the 49 parameter estimates; the columns labeled p0.05 and p0.95 show the
fifth and 95th percentiles of the set of parameter estimates, respectively; and the
column labeled “fraction significant and correct sign” indicates the fraction of
parameters statistically different from zero with the right sign. Only five of the 49
own-price and cross-price elasticities are significant and have the appropriate sign.
We do not observe interaction effects of own-price and marketing expenditures that
are significant and have a positive sign.
To determine whether pooling of individual brand-level outcomes is allowed, we
conduct a Roy–Zellner pooling test separately for each of the five markets.3 We provide
the F values and corresponding critical values in Table 4. We conclude that, for each
of the five submarkets, the null hypothesis of poolability is rejected. Using the same
test, we find that pooling is not appropriate for the full set of data either. Therefore, the
estimates of pooled relations cannot be used to characterize brand behavior.
We present brand-level estimation results for each of the five markets in Table 5.
To conserve space, we only show the average coefficients for each market rather
than the percentiles and fractions of correctly signed and significant coefficients.
However, only three out of 50 percentile intervals corresponding to each of the 50
averages in Table 5 exclude zero. The variation in the coefficients in each row of
Table 5 provide a further illustration that pooling is not appropriate, not within
submarkets (Table 4), let alone across markets (Table 5).
In Table 6, we summarize the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) values of models 1, 3, and 4. AIC and BIC
values of model 0 and 2 are not presented due to the pooled nature of these models.
Table 2 Parameter estimates for the model of Windmeijer et al. (2005) using our data
Coefficient of Estimate
ln qi,t−1 (lag 1 of sales) 0.13*
ln qi,t−2 (lag 2 of sales) 0.12*
ln pi,t (price) −0.45*
ln mesi,t×ln pi,t (interaction) 0.001
ln pci,t (comp. price) −0.19*
ln mesi,t×ln pci,t (interaction) 0.02*
ln mefi,t (flow) 0.02*
ln mesi,t (stock) 0.05*
ln mefci,t (comp. flow) −0.03*
ln mesci,t (comp. stock) −0.01*
*p<0.05 (two-tailed)
3 This test can be considered as a generalization of the Chow (1960) test and is recommended in cases in
which there is possible heteroskedasticity (Baltagi 2005).
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We conclude that the in-sample fit of model 1 is best, followed by models 3
and 4. The comparison between models 3 and 4 indicates that the inclusion of
interaction terms leads to a better (in-sample) fit when we look at AIC values.
However, if we consider BIC values (which penalize the number of variables
more heavily), model 4 is preferred.
In Table 7, we present a comparison of the predictive validity of the competing
models. We estimated models 0–4 again, now excluding the last five observations of
each brand. Subsequently, the last five observations were predicted using the
calibrated models. We use the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) as our
measure of predictive validity.
Table 7 shows that the brand-specific models outperform the pooled models in
terms of predictive validity, supporting the conclusion that pooling is not
appropriate. Model 4, the simplest model, has the best predictive validity. Models
2 and 3 suffer from multicollinearity due to the inclusion of many interactions. The
simpler model 4 is much less subject to this problem. This may explain why the
predictive validity of this model is best.
In Table 8, we summarize the findings of model 4. For each of the variables, we
report the mean, the fifth and the 95th percentiles, and the fraction of brands for
which the estimated parameters have the expected sign and are significant.
Table 4 Roy–Zellner pooling test per submarket






Table 3 Brand-level results of the model of Windmeijer et al. (2005) (49 brands)
Coefficient of (expected sign) Mean p0.05 p0.95 Fraction significant
and correct sign
ln qi,t−1 lag 1 of sales (+) 0.02 −0.05 0.17 0.16
ln qi,t−2 lag 2 of sales (+) 0.05 −0.01 0.38 0.24
ln pi,t price (−) −0.10 −1.09 0.94 0.10
ln mesi,t×ln pi,t interaction (+) −0.05 −1.12 0.39 0
ln pci,t comp. price (+) 0.50 −1.57 5.08 0.10
ln mesi,t×ln pci,t interaction (−) −0.05 −0.42 0.13 0.08
ln mefi,t flow (+) 0.01 −0.02 0.05 0.10
ln mesi,t stock (+) −0.07 −1.47 0.21 0.02
ln mefci,t comp. flow (−) 0.07 −0.03 0.30 0
ln mesci,t comp. stock (−) −0.05 −0.51 0.19 0.06
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We conclude that the age variables describing the product life cycle patterns in
the sales data are significant for most of the brands. Own-marketing effects are
much less often right-signed and significant, and significant competitive effects
with the right sign are not present at all. It appears that detailing is effective for
more brands than the other instruments. However, the effects sizes are modest
and occur infrequently. This corresponds with the meta-analytic findings of
Kremer et al. (2008).
Comparing Table 8 to the pooled outcomes of model 0 in Table 2, we conclude
that the brand-level analysis is not in agreement with the much stronger results that
the pooled analysis appears to indicate. Specifically, the pooled outcomes indicate
significant effects of marketing expenditures, whereas the brand-level results show
that these are absent for the majority of the brands. We conclude that the pooled
outcomes do not provide adequate descriptions of reality and should not be used for
decision making and certainly not for policy making.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The past decade has seen increased activity dedicated to modeling the effects of
marketing expenditures on sales in the pharmaceutical industry. Because the
outcomes of these studies can have important consequences for decision making
by pharmaceutical companies and governments, we critically evaluate the structure
Table 5 Brand-level results of the model of Windmeijer et al. (2005), averaged per submarket
Coefficient of Ulcers Hypertension Cholesterol Depression Asthma
ln qi,t−1 (lag 1 of sales) −0.0002 −0.0003 0.02 0.09 0.001
ln qi,t−2 (lag 2 of sales) −0.001 0.03 0.05 0.10 −0.005
ln pi,t (price) 0.15 −0.15 −0.54 −0.32 −0.13
ln mesi,t×ln pi,t (interaction) 0.05 −0.08 −0.27 −0.26 −0.01
ln pci,t (comp. price) 1.17 −1.05 1.11 6.60 0.10
ln mesi,t×ln pci,t (interaction) −0.07 0.09 −0.13 −0.56 −0.01
ln mefi,t (flow) 0.01 0.01 0.002 −0.02 0.01
ln mesi,t (stock) −0.15 0.10 −0.08 −0.51 −0.03
ln mefci,t (comp. flow) 0.21 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.001
ln mesci,t (comp. stock) −0.10 −0.03 −0.18 −0.02 0.03
Table 6 Summary of AIC and BIC values for models 1, 3, and 4
Model Mean (SD) of AICs Mean (SD) of BICs
Model 1 −172.3(93.6) −93.1(90.2)
Model 3 −144.3(114.0) −62.9(111.7)
Model 4 −130.7(129.7) −64.1(127.9)
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and outcomes of an important and widely accepted model. Specifically, we consider
a recent study by Windmeijer et al. (2005), which attempts to determine the effects
of pharmaceutical promotions on GP prescribing behavior.
We replicate the study using a substantial set of the data used by Windmeijer et al.
However, in contrast to Windmeijer et al., we also determine the effects of
promotions at the individual brand level. Our empirical outcomes do not confirm
their findings. Rather, the parameter estimates of the individual brand-level models
are so different that pooling across brands, even within the same category, is
inappropriate, which further implies that we cannot confirm the conclusions of
Windmeijer et al. Specifically, we cannot confirm that:
a. premarketing own-brand price elasticities are negative;
b. pharmaceutical marketing reduces the price elasticity of demand; or
c. pharmaceutical marketing increases demand.
The conclusion that price does not affect demand for the large majority of the
brands in our study is in line with earlier findings that physicians’ decisions are
driven by medical concerns and not by price (see, e.g., Gönül et al. 2001). This is a
consequence of the almost-perfect insurance coverage in The Netherlands: neither
for patients nor for physicians, there is a financial stimulus to be price sensitive.
Furthermore, pharmaceutical prices are strongly regulated so that price fluctuations
are scarce and small.
We also do not find evidence that marketing expenditures reduce price sensitivity.
This effect of marketing is known as the persuasive function of marketing (Leffler
1981; Hurwitz and Caves 1988) and is unwanted because, ceteris paribus, doctors
Table 8 Summary of results of model 4 (49 brands)
Coefficient of (expected sign) Mean p0.05 p0.95 Fraction significant
and correct sign
Ageit age (+) 0.17 0.09 0.30 1
Age2it age squared (−) −0.0006 −0.0019 −0.00001 0.65
ln JADit journal adv. (+) 0.027 −0.007 0.051 0.06
ln DETit detailing (+) 0.014 −0.047 0.050 0.10
ln DMit direct mail (+) 0.007 −0.070 0.027 0.04
ln mefcit comp. flow (−) 0.053 −0.067 0.257 0
Table 7 Summary of the predictive validity of models 0–4
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should choose the cheapest alternative (De Laat et al. 2002, p. 60). If marketing
expenditures would make physicians less price sensitive this could be interpreted as
increasing “brand loyalty not supported by product characteristics” (De Laat et al.
2002, p. 80). In turn, this may lead to higher prices, thereby harming social welfare
(Windmeijer et al. 2005). Consequently, the welfare implications of our findings are
fundamentally different from those of Windmeijer et al. (2005). We cannot confirm
that marketing has negative welfare effects due to reducing the price elasticity of
demand. Instead, we find that, on average, the marketing–price interaction is
negative, which is an indication of the informative function of marketing (Leffler
1981). This has interesting policy implications. There is no need for policy options
aiming at increasing price sensitivity (see, e.g., de Laat et al. 2002) to fight the
proclaimed persuasive effects of marketing. Instead, the informative function of
marketing can be stimulated.
Our findings that result from estimating better alternative models show that
marketing effects are insignificant for the majority of the brands in our sample
and that their sizes are modest. Our findings further suggest that it is useful for
pharmaceutical researchers and practitioners to accommodate differences in
promotional instruments (cf., Kremer et al. 2008). This may have important
managerial implications, as it may help marketing managers to improve the
allocation of their marketing budgets over the different instruments, thereby
reducing the waste in marketing investments. Furthermore, we find that the stage
of the product life cycle should be taken into account. In the models that are
discussed in this paper, product life cycle patterns are represented by some
variables in Xit or by explicitly taking age variables into account. We also find that,
for the set of brands that we consider, pooled models are neither suited for
descriptive purposes nor for predictive purposes. Instead, simpler, brand-level
models have better predictive validity.
The parameters in models 0–4 are assumed to be constant over time. Extant
empirical research in which the authors of this paper participate (Osinga et al. 2009;
Ruiz Conde et al. 2009) shows that parameters are not constant over the product life
cycle. This implies that varying parameter models offer opportunities to obtain better
descriptions and predictions than the models which are discussed in this paper to
model the effects of pharmaceutical marketing expenditures on sales.
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